The article addresses the unavailability of reliable information regarding the processes in a nu
INTRODUCTION
Requirements to assure safe and stable operation of nuclear power plants are constantly increasing. Recently, the attention of designers and technical support companies was turned to the development of such safety systems that would allow handling/mitigation of very unlikely events, such as beyond design basis accidents and even severe accidents. It is quite reasonable for the credibility of the nuclear power industry for Ukraine and provides advantages in competition of our nuclear power plants on foreign markets. The decision to start work on severe accidents in Ukraine was made in December 2008.
The Melcor computer code was developed by the Sandia National Laboratory (USA) upon US Nuclear Regulatory Commision (NRC) request. It is an integral code designed to simulate the whole range of severe accidents phenomena at nuclear power plants with light water reactors, from the initial point of an accident down to the final state. Simulation of nuclear power plant by the Melcor code was considered appropriate in our specific case, because the code was adopted for WWER 440 and WWER 1000 designs in the frame of IAEA regional projects RER/9/004 and RER/9/020.
The results achieved have been compared with those of calculation by the Relap/Scdap code, which proved to be quite accurate.
TASK FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
One of the preconditions of safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants is the availability of reliable monitoring and control of the whole range of parameters as for normal operation, as well as for abnormal or emergency conditions. As modeling of emergencies on real power plants is out of the scope of discussion, use of proven computer codes, such as Relap/Scdap and Melcor, is a reasonable alternative [1] .
The work is aimed to estimate the "degree of realism" of the power plant transients calculation results received by the Melcor code, comparing them against the results of the Relap/Scdap code.
The results of the calculation of basic regimes, as well as those of stages of transients within reactor pressure vessel for three sample accidents, are presented in the article:
• the maximum design-basis accident (complete guillotine break of "cold" primary loop at the entrance to the reactor) coincident with unavailability of the high-pressure emergency core cooling system (HP ECCS); • severe accident "guillotine break of the reactor cold loop coincident with complete blackout and failure of all active ECCS;" • severe accident "complete plant blackout, with the loss of steam generators feedwater and secondary heat sink."
DESCRIPTION OF THE REACTOR MODEL FOR THE MELCOR CODE
The following served as the basis for the simulation model: the previously developed Melcor 1.8.3 model, used for analysis of beyond design basis accidents, RELAP 5 [2] databases of nuclear steam supply system, as well as additional reference materials related to modeling of severe accidents on RELAP/SCDAP-SIM/Mod3.4 code [3] . This nodalization has been preliminarily tested with similar one-dimensional thermal-hydraulic codes, in particular, RELAP and ATHLET. The primary circuit is modeled by 121 control volumes, which are connected by 171 flow paths. The reactor is modeled by 21 control volumes. The core is divided into five radial control volumes, for a more correct assessment of the corium formation impact on the dynamics of the emergency process. The secondary circuit is modeled by 24 control volumes, which are connected by 38 flow paths.
For more accurate modeling, the primary side of steam generators has been divided into control volumes in height and in length [4] .
To assess the influence of the secondary water-steam mixture circulation on the transient, the steam generator has been divided into control volumes.
As the behavior of the fuel temperature at the initial (design) stage of the maximum design basis accident, calculated by the Melcor code, was doubted, the sensitivity analysis for the reactor core nodalization has been performed: one-di-mensional or quasi-two-dimensional, according to the breakdown of fuel assemblies in the radial zones. It had no impact on the physicality of the results. Nevertheless, it was decided to keep the quasi-version of the core breakdown. An additional argument in favor of this option was the comparability of results with calculations performed on the Relap/Scdap code.
Further calculations proved the work of the core reflooding model not quite correct in revision 1.8.5, which is mentioned in the User's Guide [5] .
For better comparability of results, the energy releases in the core were given in the form of a table function. The level of the energy releases depending on the time and their initial profiles (vertical and radial zones) was calculated by the RELAP/SCDAPSIM code.
Results of calculations of stable state corresponded quite well to the parameters predefined in the Tech Spec.
MAXIMUM DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENT (COMPLETE GUILLOTINE BREAK OF THE PRIMARY LOOP AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL) AND OPTIONAL CALCULATION OF AN ACCIDENT WITH COINCIDENT FAILURE OF ALL HIGH-PRESSURE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
The guillotine break of the cold primary leg at the entrance to the reactor leads to primary depressurization and loss of the pressurizer coolant level. According to the scenario of the accident, passive ECCS and one channel of the low-pressure ECCS (LP ECCS) are in operation. Two emergency consequences were addressed -the first one with one HP ECCS train being operable and the second one with HP ECCS being inoperable. Figure 1 shows the coolant level in the core. Figure 2 shows the temperature of the fuel cladding.
0Hp1Lp4HA -the ECCS hydro accumulators (ECCS HA) and one channel of the LP ECCS are operable; the HP ECCS -failure; 1Hp1Lp4HA -the ECCS hydro accumulators, one channel of the LP ECCS and one channel of the HP ECCS -all are operable.
The Melcor code against Relap/Scdap code results are presented in Table 1 .
The results of Melcor calculations well match the parameters calculated with the Relap code. In the Melcor code, the maximum design-basis accident runs without the hydrogen generation in the reactor and without core damage, which corresponds to the Tech Specs. Even complete unavailability of HP ECCS does not lead to severe core damage. Both codes show identical time of start and completion of ECCS HA discharge -10th and 72nd second of the process, respectively. The temperature of the primary circuit elements also shows similarity.
As a result of the calculations of the initial stage, we can conclude that the model developed by the Melcor code is quite correct.
FIG. 1:
Coolant level in the core.
FIG. 2:
Fuel rods clad temperature at the first radial ring and the 15th axial level: (A) (0Hp1Lp4HA) -the ECCS hydro accumulators (HA ECCS) and one channel of the LP ECCS are operable; the HP ECCS -failure; (B) (1Hp1Lp4HA) -the ECCS hydro accumulators, one channel of the LP ECCS and one channel of the HP ECCS -all operable.
SEVERE ACCIDENT (COMPLETE GUILLOTINE BREAK OF COLD LOOP AT ENTRANCE TO REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL, COINCIDENT WITH COMPLETE BLACKOUT AND FAILURE OF ACTIVE ECCS)
The guillotine break of the primary cold leg leads to fast primary depressurization and loss of the pressurizer coolant level. Maximum flow rate to the leak is 34,000 kg/s. At 0.2 s after the accident, the reactor emergency shutdown of a nuclear reactor (SCRAM) (ERP) is actuated (reduction of primary pressure down to 15 MPa when reactor power level is more than 75%). At this point, loss of the external power and failure of all three diesel generators was simulated to start on demand.
As a result, all active ECCS became inoperable. ECCS signal is actuated at 0.3 s of the accident (reduced saturation margins at the core exit less than 10 o C), but active ECCS fail to start as a result of bounding conditions. Injection of concentrated boric acid from ECCS HA into the reactor begins at the10th second (primary pressure less than 6 MPa). At the 72nd second of the accident the ECCS HA are empty.
The fuel temperature growth starts on the 110th second after the initial event. Intensive generation of hydrogen begins at about 400 s of the accident. Cladding, and subsequently the fuel, starts melting after about 500 s after the initial event.
As the core water inventory is lost by this time, the corium starts to move toward the reactor lower plenum after about 1000 s. Later, under absence of water steam, the generation of hydrogen in the reactor slows down sharply, and almost completely stops after 1250 s. Complete collapse of the core takes place by 2500 s of the accident. Figure 3 shows the temperature of the cladding (the 12th axial level for all radial rings). It also shows the amount of hydrogen generated in the reactor; total, and resulting from zirconium-steam reaction (Fig. 4) . Total amount of hydrogen generated in the reactor core (kg) 0 0
FIG. 3:
Cladding temperature (the 12th axial level of the core, all radial rings).
FIG. 4:
Mass of the hydrogen generated in the reactor; total, and resulting from zirconium-steam reaction. Table 2 shows the chronology of the process, calculated using the RELAP/ SCDAPSIM model, as well as the calculations performed on MELCOR 1.8.5 and the results of calculations performed in the Physics and Energy Institute (PhEI) for Unit No. 3 of South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP) and adapted for Unit No. 1 of SUNPP [6, 7] .
Note that at the early phase of the accident (up to the end of the operation of ECCS HA) all results are in agreement, not only qualitatively but also have a good quantitative agreement. Differences in the beginning of fuel temperature growth and hydrogen generation are caused by both differences in nodalization scheme and different models of two-phase flow used in different codes.
In the RELAP/SCDAPSIM calculations the amount of hydrogen generated in the reactor is significantly lower than the results given by the PhEI and calculated using the MELCOR model. At the same time, the correspondence between the results of the different computer codes in assessment of the total amount of generated hydrogen must be considered as satisfactory, taking into account the significant differences in reactor nodalization scheme and in the modeling of physical processes. 
CALCULATION OF THE INITIAL EVENT, "COMPLETE STATION BLACKOUT, WITH LOSS OF SG FEEDWATER AND SECONDARY HEAT SINK"
Complete plant blackout generates reactor SCRAM (Emergency protection -1), which leads to turbine trip, turbine driven feed water pumps trip, the reactor cooling pumps [main circulation pump (MCP)] are running in run-down mode. Safety diesel (DG) start-up is initiated but, due to the postulated failure, the DGs fail to start on demand. Availability of the redundant standby diesel station is also not taken into account due to bounding initial conditions (complete loss of station power). As a result, all active ECCS, including emergency feed water pumps, are unavailable. The availability of steam dump to atmosphere valves is also not taken into account because the valves have power supply from the safety batteries (first safety category) and the batteries have limited capacity and considerable uncertain discharge time (battery life). Thus, the heat sink at the initial stage of the accident, after the MCP rundown, is caused by natural circulation to the SGs and then with steam dump through the SG safety valves to the atmosphere.
Loss of secondary coolant inventory and consequent reduction of SG water level leads to reduction of residual heat transfer from the primary coolant. The parameters of the primary circuit start growing (reactor coolant temperature and pressure).
According to Severe Accident Management Guideline (SAMG) requirements, the operator's actions are to open emergency off gas line and the pressurizer safety relieve valve (SV) to reduce the primary circuit pressure. These actions are aimed to initiate water injection to the reactor from ECCS HA and to avoid core melt under high-pressure conditions. At the same time, the operator takes possible measures to delay the core uncovery and overheating. Thus, the opening of emergency off gas line and pressurizer SV is advisable at a later stage of the accident, but the time should not exceed the time of full discharge of the batteries. In the PhEI calculations, the minimum reliability of the batteries was assumed to be 1 h. In fact, this time limit has been established as a threshold for the operator for primary depressurization below the set point of ECCS HA actuation.
The opening of the emergency off gas line and the pressurizer SVs initiates loss of the primary coolant to the containment. Primary coolant in the reactor starts boiling. Further formation of steam bubbles into the primary loops and decrease of SG water level (Fig. 5) interrupts the natural circulation of the coolant in primary loops. From this point, the heat sink is provided by the primary coolant flow to the pressurizer relief tank and then into containment.
At 6300 s of the accident the sharp decrease of reactor coolant level starts. This leads to gradual uncovery of fuel elements, loss of heat sink from the core, and overheating of the fuel. Intensive generation of hydrogen begins after 11,000 s of the accident. Severe Accident Modeling for WWER ReactorsECCS HA actuation begins at 6350 s of the accident and continues until the end of the calculation. Flow from ECCS HA does not compensate the loss of coolant through the emergency off gas line and the pressurizer SVs, because the flow is a function of the pressure reduction in the reactor. After 9000 s of the accident the progressive destruction of the core starts. Intensive generation of hydrogen ends after 22,500 s (due to reduction of the steam amount after loss of primary water inventory in the reactor). At the end of the calculation, the total mass of hydrogen generated in the reactor is about 750 kg. Figure 6 shows the temperature of the cladding (the 12th axial level for all radial rings). It also shows the mass of the hydrogen generated in the reactor, total and generated by zirconium-steam reaction (Fig. 7) .
The results of the Melcor code calculation against results of the other codes are presented in Table 3 .
The results are in agreement not only qualitatively but also have a good quantitative agreement. Differences in the beginning of the fuel overheating and hydrogen generation are caused by both differences in nodalization scheme and different models of two-phase flow used in different codes.
Thus, the developed Melcor model is physically correct and is capable of describing the processes in the reactor during severe damage of the fuel for the considered initial event correctly and with sufficient accuracy.
FIG. 7:
Mass of the hydrogen generated in the reactor, total and generated by zirconiumsteam reaction.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the developed model, Melcor calculations for the bounding accidents considered in substantiation of severe accident management strategies for WWER nuclear power plants have been performed.
The calculation results have been compared with the calculations on the RELAP/SCDAPSIM/Mod3.4 code, and those made in the PhEI with the complex of "Socrates" codes for SUNPP unit No. 3 [6] and adapted for SUNPP unit No. 1 [7] . The comparison proved the lack of qualitative, as well as significant quantitative, difference for the initial stages of the accident, from the initiating event and up to the point of severe fuel damage, and in some cases, up to the completion of the core melt and the end of the intensive phase of the hydrogen generation.
Thus, the developed model can be considered as a physically correct one, adequately reflecting the phenomenology of the processes in reactor core at the initial stage of the bounding accidents. The code, in accordance with the results obtained, can be used as one of the main tools for analytical substantiation of severe accident management strategies and the development of the severe accident management guidelines for nuclear power plants in Ukraine. Start of an intense hydrogen generation 11,000 10,000 8,700
Completion of an intense hydrogen generation 22,500 22,500 17,000
Start of the corium composition in the reactor lower plenum 9,050 13,800 13,200
Total weight of hydrogen (kg) 750 1,120 860
